Archived
feat(verify): owner decisions batch 07 (151-138); sources traced for 145 and 138
145/138: the records' descriptions are Jameson Lopp's list entries; his cited Border Report story (Wayback copy now filed) carries neither the hardware wallet nor the $1.4m; Bloomberg 2026 (blocked) has the wallet dig-up per search snippets. DOJ and TRM texts filed on both. Targeting-vector attribute proposed in DEFINITIONS.md. 147 and 151 decisions applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GZZENdTLzNGsbNy4DyF1yt
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5.1
parent
f794b18480
commit
dc320daa61
@@ -88,3 +88,22 @@ These apply the glossary's Detention entry to edge cases met during the flag rev
|
||||
## Owner's clarification on Authority Misuse (2026-09-30)
|
||||
|
||||
Authority is not only police, military or officials. A real or claimed service position that the victim defers to (a rideshare driver asking for the passenger's phone "to navigate", a delivery worker, a concierge, a bank or exchange employee) is a position of trust, and exploiting it to obtain compliance or access is Authority Misuse. The glossary's "fabricated positions of power ... false legitimacy" covers these roles. Case 173 (fake Uber driver, Scottsdale) is the reference case. This includes a claimed role used only to get a door or gate opened (fake parcel, courier, food delivery, painter, postal or construction uniform) and a police uniform worn on the approach: Authority Misuse is then the initiation label, followed by Home Invasion, Kidnapping or Dodged Attack as the file supports. Owner ruling 2026-09-30, applied to 29 cases besides 173 and 185. Not applied where the file does not show the role being used (397: no impersonation in the file; 434: whether the hired driver was involved is unknown).
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposed attribute: targeting vector (owner proposal, 2026-09-30)
|
||||
|
||||
How the attackers selected and found the victim, recorded separately from the scenario sequence (which describes the attack itself). One value per case, "unknown" allowed; several values may be listed when the sources support them. Proposed values:
|
||||
|
||||
- **data leak / breach** — customer database, tax-report or exchange leak (e.g. the Waltio leak behind 490; the Ledger customer leak)
|
||||
- **public records** — addresses or tax records obtained legally (Sweden's Offentlighetsprincipen, company registers)
|
||||
- **insider tip-off** — employee, contractor, guard, bank or agency insider who passed on the victim's holdings or movements (152, 380, 371)
|
||||
- **family / partner** — a relative or intimate partner organised or enabled the attack (212, 200)
|
||||
- **acquaintance / friend** — a friend or social contact turned attacker (153, 179, 206, 204)
|
||||
- **business counterparty** — prior trades, P2P history, investment dispute or co-investor conflict (194, 208, 241, 154)
|
||||
- **public profile / media** — wealth or holdings shown publicly, interviews, influencer content, rich lists (Costly Fame cases)
|
||||
- **social media / livestream** — targeting shortly after posts or streams about crypto (Wall's Swedish cases)
|
||||
- **online lure** — fake account, dating or investment contact built online before the meeting (197, 14)
|
||||
- **surveillance / following** — physical reconnaissance, GPS tracker, tailing from an exchange or bank (184, 183)
|
||||
- **opportunistic** — no prior selection (street muggings)
|
||||
- **unknown**
|
||||
|
||||
This absorbs the "prior acquaintance / insider" attribute proposed earlier today. Population of the field across the 393 cases is a separate pass; the scenario-sequences.json gap notes tagged preparation, insider, acquaintance and leak are the starting list.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user