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StellarCrow 41766c68a2 chore: final state before the move to gart/gart-databases
Commits the work done since 2026-10-01 that was still local: the four-step
label and flag passes, the triage and recheck files, the v1 exports of
2026-10-06 and 2026-10-07, the split dossiers, and the Lopp PR 234 batch
(scripts, agent prompts, reader and checker files, the flag re-read of
2026-10-17, the review workbook and the import set of the 57 cases added
to stats2 as 506 to 562). Raw HTML and node_modules stay out (.gitignore).

The stats2 material in use was copied to gart/gart-databases (stats2/) on
2026-10-17; README-START-HERE.md now says so. This repo is closed.
2026-10-17 10:47:37 +02:00

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KEY L072
STATUS new
CURRENT VALUES (written under the old rule, to be re-read)
detention yes
violence_torture no
drugs_alcohol no
weapons no
theft unconfirmed
life_taken 0
obtained Unconfirmed
LOPP'S LINE (a lead, not a source; the only text for a no-source entry)
On March 12 2022, on the orders of Adam Iza ('Crypto Godfather'), the brother of an LA sheriff's deputy physically grabbed an associate of victim 'E.Z.' to steal a laptop containing cryptocurrency that Iza claimed as his own; a private investigator employed by Iza kept watch and drove the attacker away. These facts are detailed in paragraph 10 of the federal complaint filed September 23 2024.
=== work/articles/L072-1.txt
URL https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.942083/gov.uscourts.cacd.942083.1.0.pdf
TITLE Case 2:24-mj-05809-DUTY
[9] AFFIDAVIT I, Special Agent Barbara Johnson, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows: I. 1.
[10] PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT
[11] This affidavit is made in support of a criminal
[12] complaint and arrest warrant against ADAM IZA (“IZA”), also known as “Ahmed Faiq” and “The Godfather,” for conspiracy against rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, and evasion of tax assessments, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. 2.
[13] The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon
[14] my personal observations; my training and experience; and information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and witnesses.
[15] This affidavit is intended to show merely that there
[16] is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint, arrest warrant, and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge of or investigation into this matter.
[33] The FBI has been investigating IZA and Los Angeles
[34] Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) deputies, known and unknown, for (1) extorting money and property from victims in Los Angeles and elsewhere; (2) the payments by IZA to LASD deputies in return for their commission of unlawful acts in their capacity as a law enforcement officers; (3) unlawful searches and arrests by LASD deputies in an effort to intimidate and silence victims; and (4) the evasion of tax assessments related to IZA’s receipt of tens of millions of dollars obtained through fraudulent means and the evasion of tax assessments by LASD deputies, including an LASD deputy referred to here as “LASD Deputy 1.” 5.
[47] Based on records, witness interviews, my review of
[48] electronic communications, and my knowledge of this investigation, I know the following: A.
[49] Extortion of Victim E.Z. and Execution of Unlawful Warrant 7.
[50] On or about June 3, 2022, the FBI became aware of a
[51] letter written by an attorney representing a Victim E.Z. requesting law enforcement assistance relating to an alleged extortion and robbery committed by IZA.
[52] The FBI also
[53] interviewed a private investigator who worked for IZA.
[54] The
[55] private investigator corroborated the reported robbery of an associate of Victim E.Z.
[56] Further, the FBI reviewed text
[57] messages that IZA sent showing that an LASD deputy unlawfully obtained a warrant targeting Victim E.Z. as part of IZA’s campaign of intimidation and harassment. i. 8.
[61] The report set forth
[62] the following allegations: a. years.
[63] Victim E.Z. had known IZA for approximately two
[64] They were involved in business arrangements in the past.
[70] Victim E.Z. and IZA recently discussed a business deal involving a medical service platform and cryptocurrency.2 b.
[123] The letter written by Victim E.Z.’s attorney related
[124] the following information pertaining to subsequent events: a.
[125] On or around December 2, 2021, Victim E.Z.
[126] received text messages from an unknown number, which contained photos of Victim E.Z.’s CLETS report.4
[127] One of the photos of the
[128] CLETS report displayed the top portion of a LASD business card. Victim E.Z. believed these messages were sent for the purpose of intimidation. b.
[129] On or around December 15, 2021, Victim E.Z.
[130] alleged that IZA and his bodyguards showed up at Victim E.Z.’s associate’s residence looking for Victim E.Z.
[131] Prior to this
[132] visit, the associate received a text message from a number previously used by IZA to communicate with E.Z.
[133] The text
[134] message indicated that the sender knew Victim E.Z. was staying at the residence and threatened Victim E.Z., demanding that Victim E.Z. turn over his laptop with cryptocurrency to IZA.
[135] screenshot of this message was included in Victim E.Z.’s attorney letter:
[147] IZA Private Investigator Corroborates Victim E.Z.
[148] Since September 6, 2022, the FBI conducted multiple
[149] interviews of K.C., a private investigator, who provided the following information:5 K.C. and his attorney have provided the FBI with video and documentary evidence. Much of that evidence was received from IZA’s counsel during the civil discovery process. Some of that discovery included hyperlinks to videos stored on the cloud. Those videos included screen-recordings of Telegram conversations between IZA and an individual M.I. during the (footnote cont’d on next page) 5
[155] In November 2021, IZA hired K.C. to locate and
[156] surveil Victim E.Z.
[157] IZA indicated to K.C. that Victim E.Z. was
[158] in possession of a laptop that Victim E.Z. had stolen from IZA. K.C. conducted surveillance and was in continuous communication with IZA and several of his associates. b.
[159] K.C. communicated with IZA via the encrypted
[160] communications application “Telegram” and through calls and text messages. K.C.
[161] IZA sent photos of sensitive law enforcement data to
[162] This data included multiple photos of a computer screen
[163] depicting DMV driver’s license information not available to the general public and photographs of a computer screen depicting what appeared to be a GPS search warrant on a phone number believed to belong to Victim E.Z.
[170] IZA made statements in messages to K.C.
[171] indicating that IZA paid law enforcement officials to provide IZA with information on the location of E.Z. d. IZA and K.C.
[172] K.C. showed the FBI a text message thread between On January 19, 2022, IZA sent a message to K.C.
[173] stating, “I found where [Victim E.Z.] staying” and then provided Victim E.Z.’s address.
[174] After additional exchanges, K.C. asked
[175] IZA, “How’s you guys find him Did this location come up on databases?” IZA responded, “Nop...We pinged his phone...For last 3 weeks...He had it off...Turned it off for 10 minutes...And turned back off.” BS service.”
[176] K.C. responded, “Oh. Nice.
[177] Usually that’s a
[178] IZA stated, “The ping was done by law enforcement
[179] themselves...It took a Warrant...And had to get signed by judge.”
[180] IZA then sent K.C. a photo which appeared to be of a
[181] screen showing a GPS ping warrant with Victim E.Z.’s phone number circled. e.
[182] On or about March 12, 2022, the brother of an
[183] LASD deputy referred to here LASD Deputy 2, allegedly robbed Victim E.Z.’s associate at the direction of IZA to steal a laptop.
[184] K.C. was present during a meeting before the robbery,
[185] which included IZA, LASD Deputy 2, and his brother discussing the plans to, and implications of, robbing Victim E.Z.’s associate. f.
[186] On the date of the robbery, K.C. travelled to the
[187] residence and stayed outside in his car.
[188] K.C. witnessed the
[189] associate come out of the building and saw LASD Deputy 2’s brother seize the individual.
[190] K.C. then became frightened and 9
[192] drove away.
[196] Later, he then circled back, picked up LASD Deputy
[197] 2’s brother, and took him to IZA’s residence. g.
[198] K.C. provided a picture of a text message K.C.
[199] received from a number known to be used by LASD Deputy 2’s brother.
[200] The message dated March 12 shows the deputy’s brother
[201] informing K.C. that he is “perfectly hidden in front of truck,” that they would “implement your plan for a few hours,” and that “from 12 to 4am is when I think he might move like he did.” h.
[202] IZA paid K.C. via an American Express (“AMEX”)
[203] card belonging to IZA and wire transfers that originated from a company Dream Agency, discussed below. i.
[204] In or around March 2022, IZA fired K.C.,
[205] retracted payments made to K.C. through AMEX and wire transfers, and refused to pay K.C. for services provided.6 iii. FBI Reviews Unlawfully Obtained Warrant Targeting Victim E.Z. 11.
[464] During 2021 and 2022, accounts under LASD Deputy 1’s
[465] control disbursed monetary payments to LASD deputies known and unknown. 34.
[466] As discussed above, the FBI was informed of a robbery
[467] of Victim E.Z.’s associate involving LASD Deputy 2 and his brother.
[468] Financial tracing also shows their receipt of funds
[475] from LASD Deputy 1.17 35.
[476] With respect to LASD Deputy 2:
[477] In 2021, 2022, and
[478] 2023, LASD Deputy 1 sent approximately $19,501 to LASD Deputy 2 in payments to his Chase Zelle account.
[479] The funds were
[480] transferred into the account from both LASD Deputy 1’s personal bank account and corporate bank account. 36.
[481] With respect to LASD Deputy 2’s brother:
[482] In 2022 and
[483] 2023, LASD Deputy 1 sent approximately $11,350 to LASD Deputy 2’s brother.
[484] This includes approximately $7,376 sent to his
[485] Chase Zelle account.
[486] The funds were transferred into the
[487] account from both LASD Deputy 1’s personal bank account and corporate bank account. D.